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Résumé / Abstract 
 
 
Ce papier examine l'impact des institutions sur la stratégie de propriété d’une entreprise 
multinationale. Nous développons un modèle de coentreprise internationale dans lequel une 
entreprise étrangère et son partenaire local peuvent ex post entreprendre des actions coûteuses 
pour augmenter leur part de revenus indiquée dans le contrat de coentreprise. Le modèle 
analyse les impacts de deux caractéristiques institutionnelles sur la structure de propriété 
optimale : le renforcement du contrat et le copinage. Nous introduisons le modèle de 
coentreprise dans un modèle d'équilibre général pour analyser l'impact des institutions sur le 
mode d’entrée des entreprises multinationales. 
 




This paper examines the impact of institutions on a multinational firm’s ownership strategy. 
We develop an international joint venture (IJV) model in which a multinational firm and its 
local partner both can undertake costly ex post actions to increase their revenue share 
specified by the ex ante IJV contract. The model captures the effects of two institutional 
features on the optimal IJV ownership structure: contract enforceability and cronyism. We 
introduce the IJV model into an industry equilibrium framework to analyze the impact of 
institutions on a multinational firm’s choice between forming an IJV or setting up a wholly-
owned subsidiary. 
 
Keywords: liability of foreignness, international joint venture, contract 
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A long-standing stylized fact in international economics is that ﬁrms face a
liability of foreignness (LOF) when doing business abroad (Hymer, 1976).1
Foreign ﬁrms have less information about the host country than local ﬁrms.
They may also receive inferior treatment from the host country government
due to their relative lack of connections with local oﬃcials. LOF has become
a key building block in theories of the multinational ﬁrm, which motivates
the paradigm that multinational ﬁrms need ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages to com-
pete successfully against local ﬁrms (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 1982;
Dunning, 1977; Hennart, 1982).
Despite the importance of LOF in theories of the multinational ﬁrm,
formal studies of its eﬀects on a multinational ﬁrm’s entry strategy are
scant.2 The eﬀects are not straightforward. Forming an international joint
venture (IJV) with a local ﬁrm is generally considered to mitigate LOF by
allowing a multinational ﬁrm to tap into its local partner’s resources and
connections (Hennart, 1988, 1991; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Luo, 2002).
The multinational ﬁrm can for example use its local partner’s relations with
government oﬃcials to obtain the required business licenses to set up the
IJV. Less considered, however, is the fact that once a multinational ﬁrm
is locked into an IJV, its local partner’s superior market knowledge and
contacts remain. In weak institutional environments, a local partner then
may have the possibility to use this ex post advantage to get extra private
beneﬁts from the IJV at the detriment of the multinational ﬁrm (Henisz,
2000; Perkins et al., 2007).
The following example by Desai and Moel (2008) demonstrates the eﬀects
of such an ex post LOF. In the early 1990s, the U.S.-invested enterprise CME
formed an IJV with the Czech company CET-21 to enter the Czech media
market. This joint venture was considered beneﬁcial since it should reduce
CME’s ex ante LOF. Indeed, CME counted on the strong market knowledge
of CET-21’s owner Vladimir Zelezny to ensure locally appropriate television
programming.3 Moreover, by forming an IJV, CME wanted to circumvent
the political opposition against giving television licenses to foreign investors
by assigning the ownership of the license to CET-21. The partners’ IJV
contract then speciﬁed that CME had exclusive user rights over the license.
1In recent work, however, Huang (2005) has found that foreign ﬁrms often enjoy regu-
latory advantages over weakly connected local ﬁrms.
2See Zaheer (1995, 2002) and Eden and Miller (2004) for recent surveys of the inter-
national business literature on this topic.
3An interesting anecdote: Zelezny means “man of iron” in Russian.
2The IJV’s television station launch was highly successful. In its ﬁrst year of
operation, it gained a 70 percent share of the Czech television audience. In
the second half of the 1990s, however, the partnership turned sour. At that
time, Zelezny successfully used his government contacts to obtain a ruling
that CME could no longer have exclusive use of the license. This decision
allowed CET-21 to expropriate CME’s rents from the joint venture.
The example demonstrates that well-connected local ﬁrms in weak insti-
tutional environments may have the ability to manipulate local oﬃcials to
expropriate rents from their multinational partners (Desai and Moel, 2008).
This ability aﬀects a multinational ﬁrm’s ownership strategy in two ways.
First, it reduces the attractiveness of entering a foreign market through joint
ventures with local ﬁrms. Second, it aﬀects the ex post distribution of rents
between IJV partners, thus distorting their incentives to contribute speciﬁc
investments. Therefore, it also aﬀects the optimal IJV ownership structure.
Local ﬁrms’ ability to ex post expropriate rents depends on the host
country’s institutional environment. Speciﬁcally, two institutional features
need to coexist. On one hand, cronyism needs to exist so that local oﬃcials
give preference to well-connected local ﬁrms. On the other hand, IJV con-
tracts need to be imperfectly enforceable so that the local ﬁrm can ex post
take actions to take advantage of cronyism.
This paper examines the impact of these institutional features on a multi-
national ﬁrm’s ownership strategy. In Section 2, we set up an IJV model in
which a multinational ﬁrm ﬁrst (ex ante) signs a revenue-sharing contract
with a local ﬁrm. Then each party provides specialized inputs to the IJV to
create joint revenue. Finally (ex post), parties can conduct costly actions to
increase their revenue share. Such rent-seeking actions include government
lobbying, gifts and bribes.
Our model captures the institutional features of contract enforceabil-
ity and cronyism by modelling IJV partners’ “bribing” environments. The
stricter a country’s legal system is in enforcing contracts, the lower the in-
centives for parties to violate the stipulations of the original contract. In our
model, we thus represent contract enforceability with a parameter that cor-
responds to parties’ costs of ex post taking rent-seeking actions. To model
cronyism, we let the cost of these ex post actions be lower for local ﬁrms
than for multinational ﬁrms. An increase in disparity between parties’ costs
of ex post actions then implies more pervasive cronyism.
The results of Section 2 are as follows. Both contract enforceability
and cronyism aﬀect a multinational ﬁrm’s ownership strategy. A reduction
in contract enforceability negatively aﬀects IJV performance by (i) creating
wasteful ex post expenses and (ii) distorting partners’ investment incentives.
3In distorting incentives, it disproportionately weakens those of the minority
partner (i.e., the partner with a smaller ownership share). We ﬁnd that
it is thus optimal to deal with lower contract enforceability by allocating
a larger ownership share to the minority partner. Cronyism also distorts
partners’ investment incentives by strengthening those of the local ﬁrm while
weakening those of the multinational ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that it is therefore
optimal to deal with cronyism by allocating a higher ownership share to the
multinational ﬁrm. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that cronyism does not necessarily
reduce IJV performance. Rather, it lowers the feasibility of an IJV. In
sum, IJV partners need to take into account both institutional features to
determine their optimal IJV ownership structure.
In Section 3, we introduce our IJV model into an industry equilibrium
framework to analyze the impact of the institutional features on a multina-
tional ﬁrm’s entry mode. In this framework, heterogeneous multinational
ﬁrms choose from two modes: (i) they can form an IJV or (ii) they can set
up a wholly-owned subsidiary. There is an intrinsic trade-oﬀ between these
modes. If a multinational ﬁrm forms an IJV, it gains a lower ﬁxed cost of
entry since it can tap into the local partner’s market-speciﬁc knowledge and
contacts. But it faces higher transaction costs due to imperfect contract
enforceability and cronyism. Inversely, setting up a subsidiary permits it to
gain lower transaction costs at a higher ﬁxed entry cost. We ﬁnd that for
more productive multinational ﬁrms, setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary
is optimal, and forming the IJV is optimal for less productive ﬁrms.
Our paper is related to recent theoretical studies on the optimal revenue-
sharing contract in joint ventures. Bai et al. (2004) and Wang and Zhu
(2005) set up joint venture models with incomplete contracting in which
ownership and control are separately contractible. In these papers, owner-
ship determines revenue-sharing, while control determines parties’ ability to
ex post take actions to acquire private beneﬁts at a loss to the joint ven-
ture. Their setups allow them to simultaneously study the optimal structure
of revenue sharing and control allocation in a joint venture. Our paper is
similar to theirs in that we both study optimal revenue-sharing contracts in
joint ventures. It diﬀers, however, in that we do not model the allocation
of control rights, but rather focus on the role of the institutional features
on ex post actions. That is, ex post actions in our model are not driven by
the allocation of control rights, but rather by the “bribing” environments in
which IJV partners operates.
Our paper also builds onto the recent literature on contract enforcement
4and multinational ﬁrms’ organizational decisions.4 This literature incorpo-
rates elements of incomplete contracts theory into general-equilibrium trade
models to analyze the determinants of multinational ﬁrms’ decisions to oﬀ-
shore and/or outsource their production activities. Our benchmark model
closely resembles that of Antr` as and Helpman (2004). By introducing costly
ex post actions into it, we contribute to this literature new analytical un-
derpinnings to study the impact of the institutional features of contract
enforceability and cronyism on a multinational ﬁrm’s organization. In this
paper, we apply our setup to study the multinational ﬁrm’s optimal owner-
ship strategy in a foreign market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the IJV
model. Section 3 incorporates the IJV model into an industry-equilibrium
framework. Section 4 concludes.
2 IJV Model
Consider a multinational ﬁrm M that sets up an IJV with a local ﬁrm D.
Let the IJV face an iso-elastic inverse demand function for its output y:
p = λ1−αyα−1, (1)
where p denotes price, the constant α ∈ [0,1/2] determines the elasticity of
demand and the constant λ > 0 reﬂects the level of demand.5
Production of ﬁnal good y requires two complementary inputs: foreign
inputs m produced by the multinational ﬁrm at unit cost ρ and local inputs
d produced by the local ﬁrm at unit cost ω. We assume that the inputs
are relationship-speciﬁc, that is, they have zero outside value if the IJV
relationship breaks down. The IJV produces ﬁnal good y from inputs m










where the constant θ reﬂects the IJV’s productivity and η ∈ [0,1] is a
parameter characterizing the intensity of foreign inputs in IJV production.
4This literature includes studies by Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2005); Antr` as
(2003, 2005) and Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008). See Spencer (2005) and Helpman
(2006) for recent surveys of this literature.
5We assume that α ∈ [0,1/2] to guarantee the uniqueness of an equilibrium in section
2.3. See Appendix for more details.
6We have purposefully adopted many of the functional forms and notation from Antr` as
and Helpman (2004) to ease comparison with the results of their paper.










We assume that revenue R is veriﬁable by an outside party, but that the
quality of inputs is unveriﬁable. To induce the parties to provide the re-
quired speciﬁc inputs, they can sign a linear revenue-sharing contract that
links their incomes to the veriﬁable joint revenue.7 Speciﬁcally, the multina-
tional ﬁrm can propose a take-it-or-leave-it IJV contract to a local ﬁrm that
speciﬁes (i) the multinational ﬁrm’s ownership share s ∈ [0,1] that gives it
right to revenue share s and (ii) a ﬁxed lump-sum payment t between the
two parties that takes place ex ante, i.e. prior to the production of inputs.
The IJV operates in an institutional environment where parties can ex
post take costly actions to adjust the ex ante determined allocation of rev-
enue. After parties have produced their inputs and revenue is realized, each
party i ∈ {M,D} can spend private resources or “bribes” to increase its
revenue share by ri.8 Let v and 1 − v denote the ex post revenue share for
the multinational and local ﬁrm respectively. Parties ex post choose rm and
rd so that the multinational ﬁrm’s ex post revenue share
v = s + rm − rd. (4)
We assume that the ex post actions are costly. To improve its ex post
revenue share with ri, a party incurs the bribing expense B(ri), which is





γi if ri > 0
0 ri = 0.
(5)
In the “bribe function” B, the parameter γi reﬂects the bribing environment
in which party i operates.9 The higher γi, the lower the bribe B that party i
pays to increase its revenue share by ri. We infer from this that an increase
7Such linear contracts are widespread in business practices due to their their simplicity
and transparency. They are also widely adopted by the literature on joint ventures, see
Bai et al. (2004) and Wang and Zhu (2005).
8We for simplicity call these rent-seeking actions “bribes”. More accurately, these
actions encompass all legal and illegal ex post transactional activities including legal ex-
penses, government lobbying and gifts.
9Our bribe function implies that a party has to pay a ﬁxed cost of 1 to bribe. This
assumption can easily be generalized to account for a ﬁxed bribing cost of any size.
6in party i’s bribing parameter γi strengthens its incentives to undertake ex
post actions.
The IJV parties’ bribing parameters γi capture two features of the host
country’s institutions: (i) contract enforceability and (ii) cronyism. First, we






An increase in γ then reﬂects lower contract enforceability. The intuition
behind this is the following. If γ is high (low), it is cheap (expensive) for
a party to ex post violate the terms of the ex ante contract. As a result,
parties have weak (strong) incentives to adhere to the ex ante contract. High
(low) γ thus corresponds to low (high) contract enforceability.
Second, we can use the diﬀerence between parties’ bribing parameters γi





If δ > 0, the cost of ex post actions is lower for a local ﬁrm than for a
multinational ﬁrm (γd > γm). This corresponds to an environment in which
oﬃcials give special treatment to well-connected local ﬁrms. We use δ to
measure cronyism, with a higher δ reﬂecting more pervasive cronyism.
Note that combining (6) and (7) yields
γd = γ + δ and γm = γ − δ, (8)
where γ ≥ δ ≥ 0. We infer from the latter condition that cronyism is
dependent on contract enforceability. Speciﬁcally, cronyism (δ > 0) can
only be present if contracts are imperfectly enforceable (γ > 0). Below, we
use (8) to insert the institutional parameters γ and δ into the model.
The IJV model can be summarized by the following sequence of events.
In period 1, the multinational ﬁrm oﬀers a take-it-or-leave-it IJV contract
(s,t) to a local ﬁrm that speciﬁes the multinational ﬁrm’s ownership share
s and a lump-sum transfer t. In period 2, both parties produce their inputs
m and d. In period 3, both parties can adjust the ex ante contract through
costly actions rm and rd. Below, we solve for the optimal IJV contract
through backward induction.
The remainder of this section is divided into three parts. In subsection
2.1, we analyze the benchmark case of perfect contract enforcement where
it is too costly for parties to conduct ex post actions. In subsection 2.2, we
7study the case of imperfect contract enforcement without cronyism to ana-
lyze the impact of contract enforceability on the optimal IJV contract and
performance. In subsection 2.3, we analyze the case of imperfect contract
enforcement with cronyism to assess the impact of cronyism on the optimal
IJV contract and performance.
2.1 Perfect Contract Enforcement
Consider the benchmark case of perfect contract enforcement where γi = 0.
For both parties, it is then inﬁnitely costly to ex post conduct rent-seeking
actions. As a result, it is optimal for each party i in period 3 to choose
ˆ ri = 0,
where the superscriptˆdenotes optimum under perfect contract enforcement.
Both parties’ ex post revenue shares then coincide with their ownership
share:
ˆ v = s.
Next, consider the parties’ choices in period 2. Here they choose proﬁt-
maximizing inputs m and d for a given contract (s,t):
max
m πm = sR(m,d) − ρm + t,
max
d
πd = (1 − s)R(m,d) − ωd − t,
where πi denotes party i’s proﬁts. By solving these problems and inserting
them into (3), we can express revenue R as a function of the multinational













In period 1, the multinational ﬁrm oﬀers a take-it-or-leave-it contract (s,t)
to its local partner that guarantees the local partner’s participation in the
IJV. It thus solves
max
s,t
πm = sR(s) − ρm(s) + t (9)
subject to
πd = (1 − s)R(s) − ωd(s) − t ≥ 0.
8By solving for the optimal contract (s,t), we derive an expression for a
multinational ﬁrm’s optimal ownership share:
ˆ s =
(
1/2 if η = 1/2
η−Ψ
2η−1 if η 6= 1/2
(10)
where
Ψ = αη(1 − η) +
p
η(1 − η)(1 − αη)(1 − α + αη). (11)
It is straightforward to show that Ψ ∈ [0,1/2] and that Ψ < η if η < 1/2,
while Ψ > η if η > 1/2. As a result, ˆ s ∈ [0,1].
[Figure 1 about here]
In Figure 1, we use (10) and (11) to plot as a solid curve the relation between
ownership share ˆ s and the intensity of foreign inputs η. Ownership share ˆ s
approaches zero when η approaches 0, it approaches 1 when η approaches
1, and it rises in between. Moreover, ˆ s is concave for η < 1/2 and convex
for η > 1/2. These properties reﬂect that parties cannot contract upon
the purchase of specialized inputs for a certain price. As a result, neither
party appropriates the full marginal return to its investments in the supply
of inputs, thus leading to underinvestment. Each party’s incentives are
then determined by its ownership share s. Ex ante eﬃciency thus requires
giving a larger ownership share to the party undertaking the relatively more
important investment into the IJV. As a result, the higher the intensity of
foreign inputs (the larger η is), the higher the multinational ﬁrm’s ownership
share ˆ s is. This leads to Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 Ceteris paribus, under perfect contract enforcement, the
multinational ﬁrm’s ownership share in an IJV rises with foreign input in-
tensity.
Next, we can derive ˆ πm by inserting the optimal contract (ˆ s,ˆ t) into (9). This
gives us
ˆ πm = λΩ, (12)
where
Ω =













9Our benchmark model with perfectly enforceable contracts replicates a key
result of Antr` as and Helpman (2004).10 Next, we will use this benchmark to
analyze the impact of the institutional features contract enforceability and
cronyism on a multinational ﬁrm’s ownership strategy.
2.2 Contract Enforceability
Consider the case of imperfect contract enforcement (γ > 0) without crony-
ism (δ = 0). In this case, it is optimal for both parties to ex post engage in
rent-seeking actions.
First, we derive parties’ optimal ex post actions for a given (s,t,m,d).
Each party chooses the optimal amount ri that solves:
max
rm
πm = (s − rd + rm)R − B(rm) − ρm + t (14)
max
rd
πd = (1 − s + rd − rm)R − B(rd) − ωd − t, (15)
where the bribe function B(ri) is given by (5) and R is short for R =
R(s,t,m,d). The solutions of these problems yield
r∗
i = γ ln(γR), (16)
where superscript * reﬂects optimum under imperfect contract enforcement.
Inserting (16) into (5) then determines parties’ bribes
B(r∗
i) = γR.
This suggests that both parties spend fraction γ of revenue R on bribes to
increase their revenue share by r∗
i.11 Since r∗
i is identical for both parties,
their eﬀects on v cancel each other out. Thus, each party’s ex post revenue
share is identical to its ownership share:
v∗ = s.
In period 2, parties choose inputs m and d for a given (s,t):
max
m
πm = (s − γ)R(m,d) − ρm + t
10Our equations (10) (11), (12) and (13) are identical to Antr` as and Helpman’s (2004)
equations (6), (7) and (10).
11Note that the IJV becomes unfeasible if γ ≥
1
2. In that case, for at least one of both
parties, the share of revenue that it needs to pay as a bribe γ exceeds its ownership share.





πd = (1 − s − γ)R(m,d) − ωd − t.
By solving these problems and inserting them into (3), we can derive revenue













It is straightforward to show from (17) that R∗ decreases with γ. The reason
is that imperfect contract enforceability negatively aﬀects both parties’ in-
centives to produce inputs. When choosing their optimal amount of inputs,
each party takes into account that, ceteris paribus, producing more inputs
increases revenue and thus raises bribe γR. This acts as a disincentive for
parties to produce inputs.
The eﬀect of imperfect contract enforceability on parties’ incentives is
not identical. While an increase in revenue induces both parties to increase
their bribes equally, the ex post distribution of the extra revenue is not
necessarily even. Speciﬁcally, the multinational ﬁrm ex post receives share s
of the extra revenue, while the local ﬁrm receives share 1−s. We infer from
this that the incentives of the minority partner in an IJV (i.e., the partner
with a smaller ownership share) are aﬀected more negatively by imperfect
contract enforceability than those of the majority partner. Below, we show
that this distortion of incentives aﬀects the optimal ownership structure.
In period 1, the multinational ﬁrm oﬀers a take-it-or-leave-it contract
(s,t) to the local ﬁrm that solves the problem
max
s,t
πm = (s − γ)R(s) − ρm(s) + t (18)
subject to
πd = (1 − s − γ)R(s) − ωd(s) − t ≥ 0.
By combining the solution of this problem with (10) and (11), we can relate
the multinational ﬁrm’s ownership share s∗ with its ownership share under
perfect contract enforcement ˆ s:




In Figure 1, we use (19) to plot the relation between ownership share s∗ and
the intensity of foreign inputs η as a dashed line. Similar to the benchmark
11case, s∗ increases with η.12 Contract enforceability aﬀects the intersect and
slope of the curve however. First, to ensure that both parties receive a
suﬃciently large share of revenue to pay the bribe γR, s∗ approaches γ
when η approaches 0 and s∗ approaches 1−γ when η approaches 1. Second,
a comparison of (10) with (19) shows that the slope of s∗ is less steep than
the slope of ˆ s and that the steepness of s∗ is positively related to contract
enforceability 1/γ. This allows us to infer the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 When the multinational ﬁrm contributes relatively more to
the IJV (η > 1/2), its ownership share decreases with γ. Otherwise (η <
1/2), its ownership share increases with γ.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is the following. Lower contract enforce-
ability disproportionately reduces the incentives of the minority partner in
the IJV. Since the multinational ﬁrm is the minority partner in a local-input
intensive IJV (η < 1/2), it is optimal to allocate a larger ownership share to
the multinational ﬁrm to improve its incentives. In a foreign-input intensive
IJV (η > 1/2), the local ﬁrm is the minority partner. In this case, it is
optimal to allocate a larger ownership share to the local partner to provide
it with more powerful incentives.
Next, we analyze the eﬀect of contract enforceability on the eﬃciency of
an IJV. By inserting the optimal contract (s∗,t∗) into (18) and combining
it with (12) and (13), we obtain:
π∗
m = λΩ(1 − 2γ)
1
1−α = ˆ πm (1 − 2γ)
1
1−α . (20)
Equation (20) suggests that a multinational ﬁrm receives share (1 − 2γ)
1
1−α
of its proﬁts under perfect contract enforcement. This share decreases in
γ and is not aﬀected by foreign input intensity η. From our discussion, an
increase in γ reduces the eﬃciency of an IJV through two channels. First,
it reduces parties’ incentives to produce inputs, thus reducing joint revenue.
Second, it increases the share of revenue that both parties waste on their ex
post actions.
Interestingly, foreign input speciﬁcity η does not aﬀect the eﬃciency loss
that an IJV faces. This observation together with Proposition 2 suggests
that an IJV in an industry with a low or high foreign input intensity η can
be equally eﬃcient as an IJV with an intermediate value of η as long as the






2 ≥ γ ≥
1
R, ˆ s > s
∗ ≥ 0 in local-input intensive industries (η < 1/2)
and 1 ≥ s
∗ > ˆ s in foreign-input intensive industries (η > 1/2).
122.3 Cronyism
Finally, we consider the case of cronyism. Let δ > 0 so that the cost of
ex post adjustment is higher for the multinational ﬁrm than for its local
partner (γd > γm). In period 3, both parties choose optimal ri for a given
(s,t,m,d). Solving (14) and (15) yields:
r~
m = (γ − δ)ln((γ − δ)R) (21)
r~
d = (γ + δ)ln((γ + δ)R) (22)
where subscript ~ reﬂects optimum in an environment with cronyism. Com-
bining (21) and (22) with (4) gives




m ≥ 0 and ∆ = ∆(R). (24)
We infer from (23) and (24) that cronyism allows the local partner to ex post
grab revenue share ∆ from the multinational ﬁrm. It is straightforward to
derive that ∆ increases with R. As we demonstrate below, this implies that
cronyism aﬀects parties’ incentives to contribute inputs.
In period 2, parties choose the inputs m and d for a given (s,t). We use
equations (21)-(24) to rewrite parties’ maximization problems as:
max
m πm = (s − ∆(R(m,d)) − γ + δ)R(m,d) − ρm + t (25)
max
d
πd = (1 − s + ∆(R(m,d)) − γ − δ)R(m,d) − ωd − t. (26)
From (23) - (26), cronyism aﬀects parties’ incentives to produce inputs, al-
beit diﬀerently. It reduces the multinational ﬁrm’s incentives to produce
inputs since the multinational ﬁrm considers that, ceteris paribus, produc-
ing more m increases R and thus increases the share ∆ that the local partner
grabs. Inversely, cronyism increases the local ﬁrm’s incentives since produc-
ing more inputs d increases R and thus raises the share ∆ that it grabs from
the multinational ﬁrm.
In period 1, the multinational ﬁrm oﬀers a take-it-or-leave-it contract
(s,t) to its local partner. In the appendix, we derive that it is optimal for a
multinational ﬁrm to choose ownership share s~ that allows it to obtain ex
post revenue share v~ :




13We also demonstrate that there is a unique s~ that corresponds to v~.
If we compare (19) with (27), v~ consists of three terms. The ﬁrst term
is the multinational ﬁrm’s optimal ownership share under perfect contract
enforcement ˆ s; the second term reﬂects the eﬀect of imperfect contract en-
forceability; and the third term reﬂects the eﬀect of cronyism. As is clear
from (27) and as is depicted with a dashed and pointed line in Figure 1,
a multinational ﬁrm thus should respond to an environment with cronyism
(δ > 0) by ensuring that its ex post revenue share increases with δ. As we
have explained above, this is because cronyism reduces the multinational’s
incentives to produce inputs, while it increases the local ﬁrm’s incentives
to produce inputs. Ensuring that the multinational ﬁrm’s ex post revenue
share increases with δ thus allows the IJV to increase the relative power of
the multinational ﬁrm’s incentives.
To obtain v~, a multinational ﬁrm needs to choose ownership share
s~. By combining (23) with (24) and (27), it is straightforward to show
that, ceteris paribus, the multinational ﬁrm’s ownership share is larger in
an environment with cronyism than in an environment without cronyism:




We state this in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 Ceteris paribus, a multinational ﬁrm’s ownership share in
an IJV is higher in an environment with cronyism (δ > 0) than in an
environment without cronyism (δ = 0).
Note that the multinational ﬁrm cannot always obtain v~ through its choice
of s~. Speciﬁcally, if v~ + ∆ > 1, it is required to choose s~ > 1, which
is not possible. In this case, it is proﬁt-maximizing to choose s~ = 1. But
this exclusive ownership goes against the notion of a joint venture. We infer
that cronyism negatively aﬀects the feasibility of forming an IJV. Two types
of IJVs are particularly prone to become unfeasible in an environment with
cronyism. First, an IJV with a higher foreign-input intensity η is more likely
to become unfeasible since this type of joint venture requires a higher v~,
thus increasing the likelihood that s~ = 1. Second, an IJV with higher
productivity θ is more likely to become unfeasible since this type of joint
venture has a higher R and therefore a higher ∆. This also increases the
likelihood that s~ = 1. We state this in the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 Ceteris paribus, cronyism reduces the feasibility of an IJV.
Feasibility is especially reduced when η and θ are high.




m = ˆ πm (1 − 2γ)
1
1−α . (29)
Interestingly, equation (29) suggests that cronyism does not entail an extra
eﬃciency loss. That is, for s~ < 1, the multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁts are
identical to its proﬁts with δ = 0 (equation (20)). Still, from Proposition 4,
we expect fewer IJVs to be formed when cronyism is present since it reduces
the feasibility of an IJV.
3 Entry mode
In this Section, we introduce the IJV model into an industry equilibrium
framework similar to Antr` as and Helpman (2004) to analyze the impact
of the institutional features on a multinational ﬁrm’s optimal entry mode.
Consider an industry-equilibrium model where a continuum of multinational
ﬁrms decide on their entry mode into a foreign market. We assume that the
multinational ﬁrms need to be physically located in the host country to sell
their products.13 Local consumers are assumed to spend a constant share
of their income on the multinational ﬁrm’s products. They have Dixit-
Stiglitz preferences that gives rise to the inverse demand function (1), where
λ depicts the aggregate consumption index. Since there is a continuum of
ﬁrms, each multinational ﬁrm takes λ as given.
For the production of a ﬁnal good variety, two parties are required: a
multinational ﬁrm that produces inputs m and a local entity that produces
inputs d. Parties face a perfectly elastic supply of the unique factor of
production, labor. Wages are ﬁxed so that the cost of producing a foreign
input is parameter ρ and the cost of producing a local input is parameter ω.
Final goods are produced using the Cobb-Douglas production function (2).
Similar to Melitz (2003), multinational ﬁrms diﬀer in their productivity.
To learn its productivity, a multinational ﬁrm incurs an irreversible ﬁxed cost
of entry equal to Fe. Upon paying this ﬁxed cost, it learns its productivity
level θ, which is randomly drawn from a known cumulative distribution
function G(θ). After observing its productivity level, it then decides whether
to enter the host country market. Multinational ﬁrms have two entry mode
options. First, to form an IJV with a local ﬁrm (denoted by superscript J).
Second, to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary (denoted by superscript V ).
13This assumption rules out market entry through exports from a multinational ﬁrm’s
home country.
15We assume that under both entry modes, a multinational ﬁrm signs a linear
revenue-sharing contract (s,t) with a local entity.
There is a key trade-oﬀ between both entry modes. On one hand, forming
an IJV entails a lower ﬁxed cost than setting up a subsidiary since it provides
the multinational ﬁrm with access to local ﬁrms’ market speciﬁc knowledge
and contacts: κV > κJ. On the other hand, setting up a subsidiary implies
lower transaction costs since, unlike for an IJV, contracts are considered
perfectly enforceable under this entry mode.
The industry-equilibrium model can be summarized by the following
sequences of moves: in period 0, each multinational ﬁrm decides whether
it enters the host country. If it enters, it incurs a ﬁxed cost Fe to have its
productivity level θ realized. In period 1, the multinational ﬁrm decides if
it wants to produce output or remain idle. If it decides to produce output,
it chooses to enter the market by forming an IJV with a local partner or
by setting up its own subsidiary. In period 2, the multinational ﬁrm signs a
revenue-sharing contract (s,t) with its local partner or subsidiary. In period
3, both parties produce their inputs. In period 4, IJV partners can take
costly ex post actions to improve their revenue share. The ﬁnal goods are
then produced and sold.
We can solve the model through backward induction. For periods 2-4,
we can rely on our derivations in Section 2. Speciﬁcally, we can use (20)
to infer that if a multinational ﬁrm signs an imperfectly enforceable IJV
contract with a local ﬁrm, it earns the following proﬁts:
πJ
m = λΩ(1 − 2γ)
1
1−α − κJ. (30)
Similarly, we can use (12) to infer that if a multinational ﬁrm signs a per-
fectly enforceable contract with its subsidiary, it earns proﬁts:
πV
m = λΩ − κV . (31)
In period 1, each multinational ﬁrm considers proﬁts functions (30) and
(31) to decide its optimal entry mode. In Figure 2, we plot both proﬁt
functions to graphically analyze the role of productivity on a multinational
ﬁrm’s optimal entry mode. We depict θ
α
1−α on the horizontal axis and the
multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁt on the vertical axis. In addition, we deﬁne θ1 as
the productivity level where πJ
m = πV
m.
[Figure 2 about here]
16Figure 2 demonstrates that less productive ﬁrms with θ ≤ θ1 choose to form
an IJV with a local partner, while more productive ﬁrms with θ > θ1 choose
to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary. This suggests that less productive
multinational ﬁrms choose to focus on the mitigation of ex ante LOF by
forming an IJV, while more productive multinational ﬁrms focus on the
mitigation of transaction costs by setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary. We
state this in the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 Ceteris paribus, forming an IJV is optimal for low produc-
tivity ﬁrms with θ ≤ θ1; setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary is optimal for
high productivity ﬁrms with θ > θ1.
4 Conclusion
The question at the heart of this paper is how multinational ﬁrms should
adapt their ownership strategy when facing the institutional features of con-
tract enforceability and cronyism. To address this, we have set up an IJV
model where both the multinational ﬁrm and its local partner can ex post
take costly actions to increase their revenue share. We have shown that the
IJV’s optimal ownership structure in such a model is determined by both
institutional features. Speciﬁcally, lower contract enforceability (higher γ)
disproportionately weakens the incentives of the minority partner in an IJV.
As a result, it is optimal for a multinational ﬁrm to allocate a larger owner-
ship share to the minority partner in the IJV. Cronyism (higher δ) weakens
the incentives of the multinational ﬁrm to contribute inputs to the IJV while
strengthening the incentives of the local ﬁrm. The multinational ﬁrm thus
should receive a larger ownership share in the IJV.
Next, we have introduced the IJV model into an industry-equilibrium
setup to study the eﬀect of the institutional features on a multinational
ﬁrm’s entry mode. We have demonstrated that, in an environment with low
contract enforceability and cronyism, more productive multinational ﬁrms
will set up their own subsidiary, but that less productive multinationals
will form an IJV. We have also shown that lower contract enforceability and
higher cronyism both increase the prevalence of wholly-owned subsidiaries in
an industry. Our analysis identiﬁes testable hypotheses relating institutional
features with a multinational ﬁrm’s optimal ownership strategy. This opens
the door for empirical studies.
175 Appendix
In this appendix, we solve the IJV model with cronyism (section 2.3) through
backward induction.
Period 3. For a given (s,t,m,d), parties solve
max
rm
πm = (s − rd + rm)R − e
rm
γ−δ − ρm + t (A-1)
max
rd
πd = (1 − s + rd − rm)R − e
rd
γ+δ − ω.d − t (A-2)
The solution of these problems gives:
r~
m = (γ − δ)(lnR + ln(γ − δ)) (A-3)
r~
d = (γ + δ)(lnR + ln(γ + δ)). (A-4)
To simplify notation below, let
∆(R) = r~
d − r~
m = 2δ lnR + (γ + δ)ln(γ + δ) − (γ − δ)ln(γ − δ). (A-5)
Then, the multinational ﬁrm’s ex post revenue share is
v = s − ∆(R). (A-6)
Period 2. For a given (s,t), parties choose inputs m and d. By inserting




πm = (s − ∆(R) − γ + δ)R − ρm + t (A-7)
max
d
πd = (1 − s + ∆(R) − γ − δ)R − ωd − t, (A-8)
where R is a shortcut for R(m,d), which is given by (3).
Next, we will demonstrate that when α ∈ (0,1/2) for any ﬁxed s, there
exists a unique optimal m~ and d~, and, therefore a unique v(s). This
permits us to use v as the choice variable in period 1, which will make our







The uniqueness of m~ and d~ is then assured if:
∂2πm
[∂m]




18If we solve problems (A-7) and (A-8),
∂πm
∂m
= (s − ∆(R) − γ − δ)
αηR
m
− ρ = 0 (A-9)
∂πd
∂d
= (1 − s + ∆(R) − γ + δ)
α(1 − η)R
d
− ω = 0. (A-10)



















We can then use (A-9) and(A-10) to determine that m~ and d~ are unique











d2 ((1 − s + ∆(R) − γ − δ)(α(1 − η) − 1) + 2δ(2α(1 − η) − 1)) ≤ 0,
where we infer from (A-9) that s − ∆(R) − γ − δ ≥ 0 and from (A-8) that
1 − s + ∆(R) − γ − δ ≥ 0.
Uniqueness of m~ and d~ then permits us to use v as an independent












(1 − v − γ + δ)Rα
ω
. (A-12)






v − γ − δ
ρ
η 





Combining (A-11), (A-12) and (A-13) then yields:
m(v) =





(1 − v − γ + δ)α(1 − η)
ω
R(v). (A-15)
Period 1. In period 1, the multinational ﬁrm solves for the optimal contract
(s,t). Since there is a unique v~ corresponding to s~, we can use v as




πm = (v − γ + δ)R(v) − ρm(v) + t
subject to




πm = ((1 − αη)(1 − 2γ) − α(1 − v − γ + δ))R(v) (A-16)
We can then solve (A-16) to obtain v~:




where ˆ s is given by (10). From (A-6), we can obtain the corresponding s~
as
s~ = v~ + ∆(R~)
Finally, we can insert (A-17) into (A-16) and combine with (20) to derive
the multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁts:
π~
m = π∗
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Figure 1: Optimal ex post revenue distribution in an IJV
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Figure 2: Productivity and Entry Mode
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